Initial SOC memory POC implementation
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{
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"id": "KB-O365-INBOX-RULE-ABUSE",
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"memory_type": "knowledge",
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"doc_type": "kb",
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"scenario": "o365_suspicious_login",
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"title": "Inbox Rule Abuse After Account Compromise",
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"abstract": "Common mailbox persistence behaviors after O365 account compromise, especially rule creation to hide or forward finance emails.",
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"key_points": [
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"Attackers often hide financial emails using move-to-folder rules.",
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"Forwarding and delete rules are strong post-compromise indicators.",
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"Mailbox audit logs should be reviewed immediately after suspicious login confirmation."
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],
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"investigation_guidance": [
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"Enumerate all inbox rules and forwarding settings.",
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"Check mailbox audit timeline around suspicious sign-in.",
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"Review OAuth consents if inbox rules are absent but suspicious mail actions continue."
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],
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"decision_points": [
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"Inbox rule creation shortly after suspicious login strongly supports compromise verdict."
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],
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"related_refs": {
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"playbooks": [
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"PB-O365-LOGIN-001"
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],
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"cases": []
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},
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"source_path": "/home/tom/soc_memory_poc/evaluation/datasets/mock_kb/kb/KB-O365-INBOX-RULE-ABUSE.json",
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"tags": [
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"kb",
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"o365",
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"inbox-rule"
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]
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}
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