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Initial SOC memory POC implementation

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tomtan
2026-04-27 17:13:06 +08:00
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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/o365_suspicious_login/CASE-2026-1001.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-1001",
"title": "Impossible travel login followed by MFA prompt fatigue",
"scenario": "o365_suspicious_login",
"alert_type": "azuread_impossible_travel",
"severity": "high",
"status": "confirmed",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-02T22:10:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-02T23:30:00+08:00"},
"summary": "User account showed impossible travel between Shanghai and Amsterdam, followed by repeated MFA prompts and successful sign-in.",
"alert_source": "Microsoft Entra ID",
"entities": {"users": ["david@corp.example"], "hosts": ["WS-DAVID-01"], "mailboxes": ["david@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"ips": ["203.0.113.150", "198.51.100.61"], "domains": [], "urls": [], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["Two successful sign-ins from geographically impossible locations within 15 minutes.", "MFA challenge volume increased abnormally before final success.", "User confirmed they did not initiate overseas login."],
"investigation_steps": ["Review sign-in logs and device IDs.", "Check MFA event sequence.", "Validate user travel status with manager."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "true_positive", "reason": "Impossible travel plus user denial and MFA fatigue pattern.", "recommended_actions": ["Revoke sessions and reset credentials.", "Review mailbox rules and app consent."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-O365-LOGIN-001"], "kb": ["KB-O365-IMPOSSIBLE-TRAVEL", "KB-O365-MFA-FATIGUE"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Impossible travel needs to be combined with user confirmation and MFA telemetry."],
"tags": ["o365", "login", "impossible-travel", "mfa-fatigue"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/o365_suspicious_login/CASE-2026-1002.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-1002",
"title": "Legacy protocol sign-in from unfamiliar IP blocked by policy",
"scenario": "o365_suspicious_login",
"alert_type": "azuread_legacy_auth_attempt",
"severity": "medium",
"status": "false_positive",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-04T07:50:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-04T08:10:00+08:00"},
"summary": "Legacy authentication attempt from a cloud IP was blocked; investigation tied it to an approved migration tool test.",
"alert_source": "Microsoft Entra ID",
"entities": {"users": ["svc-migration@corp.example"], "hosts": [], "mailboxes": ["svc-migration@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"ips": ["192.0.2.24"], "domains": [], "urls": [], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["The account is a known migration service account.", "Source IP matched approved cloud migration vendor range.", "No successful sign-in occurred due to policy block."],
"investigation_steps": ["Review service account inventory.", "Check change ticket for migration activity.", "Validate source IP against vendor allowlist."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "false_positive", "reason": "Expected migration tool behavior with policy block and approved change window.", "recommended_actions": ["Tune alert suppression for approved migration windows."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-O365-LOGIN-001"], "kb": ["KB-O365-LEGACY-AUTH"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Service account context is essential before escalating legacy auth alerts."],
"tags": ["o365", "login", "false-positive", "legacy-auth"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/o365_suspicious_login/CASE-2026-1003.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-1003",
"title": "Suspicious inbox rule creation after successful foreign login",
"scenario": "o365_suspicious_login",
"alert_type": "azuread_suspicious_inbox_rule_after_login",
"severity": "high",
"status": "confirmed",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-06T19:20:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-06T20:45:00+08:00"},
"summary": "An overseas sign-in to Microsoft 365 was followed by inbox rule creation to hide finance-related emails.",
"alert_source": "Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps",
"entities": {"users": ["emma@corp.example"], "hosts": ["WS-EMMA-07"], "mailboxes": ["emma@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"ips": ["198.51.100.98"], "domains": [], "urls": [], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["Successful sign-in from untrusted ASN.", "Inbox rule moved wire transfer emails to RSS Feeds folder.", "Mailbox audit showed rule creation minutes after login."],
"investigation_steps": ["Review mailbox audit logs.", "Export suspicious inbox rules.", "Check for OAuth app consent and forwarding settings."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "true_positive", "reason": "Account compromise indicators plus malicious inbox rule persistence.", "recommended_actions": ["Remove malicious rules.", "Reset account and revoke refresh tokens."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-O365-LOGIN-001"], "kb": ["KB-O365-INBOX-RULE-ABUSE", "KB-O365-IMPOSSIBLE-TRAVEL"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Mailbox rule inspection should be default for suspicious O365 login cases."],
"tags": ["o365", "login", "inbox-rule", "account-compromise"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/o365_suspicious_login/CASE-2026-1004.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-1004",
"title": "Multiple failed logins from residential proxy but no successful access",
"scenario": "o365_suspicious_login",
"alert_type": "azuread_password_spray_attempt",
"severity": "medium",
"status": "pending",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-08T02:00:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-08T03:10:00+08:00"},
"summary": "Repeated failed Microsoft 365 sign-in attempts targeted one user from a residential proxy network, with no successful authentication observed.",
"alert_source": "Microsoft Entra ID",
"entities": {"users": ["frank@corp.example"], "hosts": [], "mailboxes": ["frank@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"ips": ["203.0.113.201"], "domains": [], "urls": [], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["High-volume failed attempts over a short period.", "Source IP attributed to a residential proxy provider.", "No matching successful sign-in or MFA event found."],
"investigation_steps": ["Check password spray pattern across tenant.", "Confirm user recent password reset history.", "Review conditional access outcomes."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "uncertain", "reason": "Suspicious authentication pattern but no confirmed access or downstream activity.", "recommended_actions": ["Monitor account closely.", "Consider temporary sign-in risk remediation."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-O365-LOGIN-001"], "kb": ["KB-O365-IMPOSSIBLE-TRAVEL"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Pending cases should still capture reusable spray indicators without overcommitting verdict."],
"tags": ["o365", "login", "password-spray", "pending"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/o365_suspicious_login/CASE-2026-1005.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-1005",
"title": "Traveling executive triggered impossible travel but activity was legitimate",
"scenario": "o365_suspicious_login",
"alert_type": "azuread_impossible_travel",
"severity": "medium",
"status": "false_positive",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-09T09:00:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-09T09:40:00+08:00"},
"summary": "Executive account triggered impossible travel due to corporate VPN exit node while the user was on an approved overseas trip.",
"alert_source": "Microsoft Entra ID",
"entities": {"users": ["grace@corp.example"], "hosts": ["VIP-LAPTOP-01"], "mailboxes": ["grace@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"ips": ["192.0.2.90", "203.0.113.77"], "domains": [], "urls": [], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["Approved travel request existed.", "One login originated from corporate VPN exit node.", "Device and user agent were consistent with known user profile."],
"investigation_steps": ["Check travel approval and itinerary.", "Review VPN egress mapping.", "Compare user agent and managed device posture."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "false_positive", "reason": "Legitimate travel combined with VPN routing caused impossible travel signal.", "recommended_actions": ["Document travel context and improve analyst checklist."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-O365-LOGIN-001"], "kb": ["KB-O365-IMPOSSIBLE-TRAVEL"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Impossible travel should consider approved travel and VPN topology before escalation."],
"tags": ["o365", "login", "false-positive", "travel"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/phishing/CASE-2026-0001.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-0001",
"title": "Finance user received invoice-themed phishing email",
"scenario": "phishing",
"alert_type": "mail_suspicious_attachment",
"severity": "high",
"status": "confirmed",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-01T09:10:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-01T11:30:00+08:00"},
"summary": "Finance user received an invoice-themed phishing email containing a malicious HTML attachment that redirected to a credential harvesting page.",
"alert_source": "Secure Email Gateway",
"entities": {"users": ["alice@corp.example"], "hosts": ["FIN-LAPTOP-12"], "mailboxes": ["alice@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"sender_emails": ["billing@vendor-payments.com"], "domains": ["vendor-payments.com", "vendor-payments-login.com"], "urls": ["https://vendor-payments-login.com/review"], "ips": ["198.51.100.20"], "hashes": ["sha256:phish0001"]},
"evidence": ["Sender domain was newly observed and failed DMARC.", "Attachment redirected to a fake Microsoft 365 login page.", "User clicked the link before mail quarantine completed."],
"investigation_steps": ["Validate sender authentication results.", "Detonate HTML attachment in sandbox.", "Check mailbox click telemetry and account sign-in logs."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "true_positive", "reason": "Aligned phishing indicators and confirmed click behavior.", "recommended_actions": ["Reset impacted account password.", "Block sender domain and landing URL.", "Hunt for similar emails in tenant."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-PHISH-001"], "kb": ["KB-PHISH-HEADER-CHECK", "KB-CRED-HARVEST-PATTERNS"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Invoice lure remains effective against finance users."],
"tags": ["phishing", "email", "credential-harvest", "finance"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/phishing/CASE-2026-0002.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-0002",
"title": "Payroll notification email flagged but determined benign",
"scenario": "phishing",
"alert_type": "mail_suspicious_link",
"severity": "medium",
"status": "false_positive",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-03T08:40:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-03T09:20:00+08:00"},
"summary": "Payroll update email was flagged due to a shortened URL, but the destination was the approved HR vendor portal.",
"alert_source": "Secure Email Gateway",
"entities": {"users": ["bob@corp.example"], "hosts": ["HR-LAPTOP-03"], "mailboxes": ["bob@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"sender_emails": ["notify@hr-vendor.example"], "domains": ["hr-vendor.example"], "urls": ["https://bit.ly/hr-portal-example"], "ips": [], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["Sender domain aligned with SPF and DKIM.", "Destination domain matched approved supplier inventory.", "No credential prompt anomaly observed."],
"investigation_steps": ["Expand shortened URL.", "Validate vendor domain against allowlist.", "Review prior communication pattern with HR users."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "false_positive", "reason": "Trusted vendor communication with expected destination.", "recommended_actions": ["Tune mail rule to reduce noisy alerts for approved HR vendor."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-PHISH-001"], "kb": ["KB-PHISH-HEADER-CHECK"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Short URLs alone should not drive phishing conclusion without destination validation."],
"tags": ["phishing", "email", "false-positive", "vendor"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/phishing/CASE-2026-0003.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-0003",
"title": "Executive impersonation email requested urgent wire transfer",
"scenario": "phishing",
"alert_type": "mail_bec_impersonation",
"severity": "high",
"status": "confirmed",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-05T13:15:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-05T15:00:00+08:00"},
"summary": "An executive impersonation email targeted finance staff with an urgent wire transfer request from a lookalike domain.",
"alert_source": "Secure Email Gateway",
"entities": {"users": ["carol@corp.example"], "hosts": ["FIN-LAPTOP-08"], "mailboxes": ["carol@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"sender_emails": ["ceo@c0rp-example.com"], "domains": ["c0rp-example.com"], "urls": [], "ips": ["203.0.113.45"], "hashes": []},
"evidence": ["Lookalike domain used numeric substitution.", "Language pressure matched prior BEC pattern.", "No historical communication from sender domain."],
"investigation_steps": ["Compare sender domain with corporate domain.", "Review historical communication graph.", "Confirm with executive assistant out of band."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "true_positive", "reason": "Strong BEC indicators and confirmed spoofed sender identity.", "recommended_actions": ["Block sender domain.", "Notify finance team and update awareness content."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-PHISH-001"], "kb": ["KB-CRED-HARVEST-PATTERNS"], "cases": []},
"lessons_learned": ["Lookalike domains need strong entity normalization in retrieval and detection logic."],
"tags": ["phishing", "bec", "executive-impersonation"]
}

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evaluation/datasets/mock_cases/phishing/CASE-2026-0004.json Normal file
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{
"case_id": "CASE-2026-0004",
"title": "Shared mailbox received OneDrive lure with HTML attachment",
"scenario": "phishing",
"alert_type": "mail_suspicious_attachment",
"severity": "medium",
"status": "confirmed",
"time_window": {"start": "2026-04-07T10:00:00+08:00", "end": "2026-04-07T12:05:00+08:00"},
"summary": "Shared finance mailbox received a fake OneDrive notification with an HTML attachment that led to credential collection.",
"alert_source": "Secure Email Gateway",
"entities": {"users": ["shared-finance@corp.example"], "hosts": [], "mailboxes": ["shared-finance@corp.example"]},
"observables": {"sender_emails": ["noreply@sharepoint-notify.com"], "domains": ["sharepoint-notify.com"], "urls": ["https://onedrive-review-login.example"], "ips": ["198.51.100.87"], "hashes": ["sha256:phish0004"]},
"evidence": ["Attachment rendered a fake Microsoft sign-in page.", "Landing page hosted outside Microsoft IP space.", "Mail body reused branding from previous phishing campaign."],
"investigation_steps": ["Render attachment safely.", "Review URL hosting provider reputation.", "Search tenant for same subject and sender."],
"conclusion": {"verdict": "true_positive", "reason": "Credential harvesting lure with campaign reuse indicators.", "recommended_actions": ["Block sender and URL.", "Search and purge duplicate emails."]},
"related_refs": {"playbooks": ["PB-PHISH-001"], "kb": ["KB-CRED-HARVEST-PATTERNS"], "cases": ["CASE-2026-0001"]},
"lessons_learned": ["Campaign reuse makes historical phishing similarity especially valuable."],
"tags": ["phishing", "email", "onedrive-lure"]
}